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In an article published elsewhere in this symposium, I critically engage with Leigh Jenco’s (2017a) 
suggestion that there are four basic conceptions of knowledge prima facie relevant to showing that one 
can learn from a foreign philosophical tradition and her claim that one of them, her self-transformative 
conception, makes the best sense of this judgment. Specifically, I advance a fifth conception of 
knowledge that appears relevant, and I argue that it does better than Jenco’s approach. According to my 
framework, what makes best sense of the idea that philosophers from one tradition often have something 
to learn from those in another one1 is the combination of metaphysical objectivity and epistemological 
fallibility.  
On the one hand, suppose there are objective philosophical facts, ones that obtain independently 
of the propositional attitudes of human individuals or groups. On the other hand, suppose that it is 
difficult to access these facts, such that certainty about philosophical matters is almost never forthcoming 
and it takes a lot of rational reflection by many people over a long span of time in order to make headway. 
Suppose, moreover, that any long-standing philosophical tradition, roughly one that has put in sustained 
enquiry over centuries, has some insight into the objective philosophical facts, which means that one’s 
own tradition lacks a monopoly of epistemic access to them and holds some incorrect views about them.  
This combination of objectivism with fallibilism, I maintain, best explains the idea that 
philosophers in one intellectual culture have strong reason to consider the views of philosophers in 
another if they want to expand their knowledge. One’s intellectual culture could always be mistaken just 
because of the objectivity of the pertinent facts, and it is likely to be mistaken about them in the absence 
of systematic exchanges with other cultures that have engaged in substantial rational reflection on them 
and, chances are, thereby acquired some knowledge.2 
In her response to this position, Jenco (2017b) contends that it is insufficient to account 
adequately for the intuition that various philosophical traditions have an equal standing and that traditions 
other than one’s own are not to be considered inferior. In addition, according to Jenco, an appeal to 
objective truth on the part of one epistemic culture is unavoidably oppressive, or overly risks being so, 
with regard to another one.  
In this brief reply, I argue that an appeal to objective truth about epistemic and moral 
justification in fact makes the most sense of Jenco’s concerns about inegalitarianism and oppression. 
Objecting to arrogant expressions of cultural superiority and imperial, colonialist, and related ambitions 
consequent to them probably commits one to an objectivist framework according to which these ways of 
treating people are really unjustified.  
 
 







2 Objectivity as Oppressive? 
 
One frequently encounters the suggestion that making a claim to objective knowledge objectionably risks 
legitimizing colonialism, paternalism, and related forms of oppression. One thinks of self-righteous 
Christian armies marching off to forcibly convert heathens or European missionaries out to civilize 
natives. Jenco (2017b) remarks that my view that there are objective facts to which no one culture has a 
monopoly, thereby requiring multicultural engagement in order to make substantial progress toward the 
truth, “bears a strong similarity to Enlightenment forms of knowledge, including the approach of JS Mill, 
who correctly saw such a view as perfectly compatible with British imperial activity in India.”  
There is no denying that those in a position of power have often been, and no doubt will 
continue to be, inclined to try to justify their exercise of it over others by claiming to be in possession of a 
putatively objective truth. That, however, does not mean that there is no objective truth to be 
apprehended.  
For an analogy, consider that Charles Darwin’s theory of the origin of the human species was put 
to unfortunate use by some thinkers who, for instance, suggested that it entailed letting the poor die off. 
However, the misuse of a theory does not mean that it is false or even epistemically unjustified. For all we 
can tell, Darwin’s theory is true; and it is true objectively, i.e., in virtue of mind-independent biological 
and historical facts (upon which an overwhelming majority of those who have studied the evidence have 
recently converged), as well as universally, such that someone who disagreed with the theory would be 
making a mistake.  
The point applies more broadly. Although some people might say that they are uniquely aware of 
an objective fact and seek to justify oppression in the name of it, it does not follow that there is no 
objective fact. It does not even follow that they are not actually aware of it.  
What follows are instead two things, I think. First, one should be epistemically careful when 
claiming to know an objective truth in which others have some stake or when holding a belief that could 
lead to actions that affect others. One need not double check one’s evidence that, say, one has a headache, 
but there might well be reason to take extra precaution when making a claim about how the human race 
originated or what the best way to live is.  
A second lesson is to be morally careful. Even if there are terrific grounds for thinking that one is 
aware of an objective truth, does that knowledge really license coercion, denigration, and other forms of 
disrespect in order to get others to believe it or to live in accordance with it? The answer is presumably 
“no”; it is perfectly coherent to maintain that one knows something, say, about human nature or values, 
that is objectively true but to deny that such knowledge authorizes the use of force against others.   
In fact, the claim that it would be wrong to use force against others in the light of objective 
knowledge is itself a claim that is plausibly objectively true, or at least implicitly believed to be such upon 
being made! Jenco is contending that British imperialism in India was unjust. Indeed, her claim is that it 
was unjust even though some people, such as Mill, thought it was not. But to make such a claim is, I 
submit, naturally (though, I acknowledge, not necessarily) understood to be asserting that British 
imperialism was objectively unjust and that Jenco knows at least this one objective moral truth whereas 
Mill and those like him did not. In short, her claim that British imperialism is wrong is best justified by 
the kind of knowledge framework I am advancing and that she is rejecting.  







On what other basis can Jenco object to the imperialism of the British empire in the way that she 
does? How else to make good sense of the idea that Mill was incorrect or unjustified about the injustice 
of imperialism in India, except by positing something mind-independent about injustice that Jenco is 
claiming knowledge of while claiming that Mill did not have knowledge of it?  
The problem I am raising is one that applies to many relativists, post-modernists, and 
post-colonialists. Often scholars who describe themselves with these terms advance moral claims, about 
socio-economic or epistemic injustice, that they passionately believe, that they know are not believed by 
everyone, and that they advance as claims that others would be mistaken or unjustified not also to believe. 
And then they juxtapose this sort of moral orientation with the further claim that there are no objective 
moral truths (perhaps since appealing to objective moral truths purportedly occasions injustice). I am 
afraid I find this combination of views to evince a serious tension that needs to be addressed: if one 
maintains that others’ moral views are mistaken, then one is probably committed to thinking that some 
moral views are objectively true3 and to maintaining that the others’ views are objectively false.  
I am not contending that Jenco’s claims cannot sensibly be held together, but I need help to see 
how she is going to avoid incoherence. It would be revealing for Jenco to explain how her knowledge 
framework can underwrite her moral criticism of British imperialism in India in the face of disagreement, 
and to consider whether it can do so with as much plausibility as an objectivist one according to which 
such imperialism was really unjust, something that many societies have thankfully learned over time.4 
 
 
3 Objectivity as Inegalitarian? 
 
Jenco advances another, distinct criticism of my appeal to objective truth, which is that, even if it did not 
legitimate intuitively unjust socio-economic practices such as imperialism, it could not avoid epistemic 
injustice. The latter “cognitive imperialism” (Jenco 2017b) comes in two forms that Jenco mentions.  
On the one hand, Jenco points out that we might make a mistake and believe ourselves to be in 
touch with an objective truth or justified in a certain belief when we are not. She says, “we may very well 
reject views of foreign others as ‘wrong’ or ‘underdeveloped’ when in fact (unbeknownst to us) it is the 
constraints of our own worldview or discipline, and not some objective true state of the world, that entail 
such judgments” (Jenco 2017b).  
In reply, of course it is possible for one culture to be mistaken and to think that another one is 
incorrect when the latter is in fact correct. But that point is part and parcel of the fallibilist epistemology I 
am advancing. According to my view, there are objective philosophical truths to which any long-standing 
culture probably has some access. Implicit in this approach is that one’s own culture is likely mistaken 
about some things, that other cultures are likely mistaken about some things, and that it is difficult to find 
the mistakes without substantial cross-cultural engagement! Keeping this fallibilism in mind alongside the 
positing of objective truth should lead one to be epistemically careful when making knowledge claims of 
philosophical realities and to take other perspectives seriously as rivals.  
Epistemic care need not mean the constant suspension of belief, however. The prospect of 
mistake is no reason to categorically prohibit thinking something to be objectively true. The earth is 
round, dinosaurs lived well more than 10,000 years ago, and water is H20. We are not certain, are not 100 







percent sure, of these scientific claims, but we are justified in taking ourselves to know these apparently 
objective truths despite others who might disagree. Analogous claims could well be forthcoming when it 
comes to issues of metaphysics and ethics, on the supposition there are objective facts about them. 
The other worry about epistemic injustice that Jenco discusses is that, upon pursuing (putatively) 
objective truth from within one’s own epistemic culture, one could not avoid viewing other knowledge 
frameworks as implausible. She suggests that some rivals “cannot be represented by a dominant discourse 
or community of knowledge production in any way other than as an inferior form of knowledge” (Jenco 
2017b), and that my objectivist fallibilism means that views that conflict with one’s own are 
  
rendered not as true forms of difference (in which multiple heterogenous forms of being or claims 
about the world can co-exist simultaneously as legitimate rivals) but rather as instances of either 
right or wrong claims about the world, that must be resolved within the cross-cultural 
philosopher’s search for truth (Jenco 2017b). 
 
The example Jenco gives is of an indigenous people that explains many events by appeal to the agency of 
imperceptible, divine beings. From a Western scientific worldview in the 21st century, this people would 
be incorrect, if not also unjustified, to claim that the movement of planetary bodies is a function of the 
efforts of gods or angels (as medieval Europeans tended to do prior to Isaac Newton). 
For an initial reply, I wonder whether it makes it any better if one recognizes that, from this 
indigenous people’s perspective, the Western scientists would be mistaken. There is a parity of viewpoint 
(though of course only rarely a parity of power) upon positing an objective fact of the matter and the 
presence of at least two incompatible accounts of it. Both sides will view the other party as incorrect, and 
there is at least a kind of epistemic (even if not political) evenhandedness, here. 
It does not follow that one should make those with the rival view feel bad, or that the other view 
should be forcibly wiped off the face of the earth, or that it has no right to exist. These are issues about 
what to say to others or about them, and about which choices to make when relating to others, and so they 
concern socio-economic practices that would be (in my view, objectively) unjust. These issues are therefore 
distinct from the present matter of whether there is epistemic injustice simply in judging others to be 
mistaken. The present issue is about how rival views are “represented,” as Jenco states above, not how 
the people who hold the views are treated.  
Of course, if one believes that other people are systematically mistaken about a topic, and if one 
continues to believe that upon having taken epistemic care, then one is unlikely to go out of one’s way to 
consult them if one is interested in knowledge about it. Yes, one could be mistaken, as per the fallibilism I 
am advancing, and so one might have reason of some strength to consult them. However, it would be fair 
of Jenco to note that, at a certain point of perceived epistemic justification, my framework grounds little 
reason of knowledge pursuit to take this sort of rival seriously. 
At this point, I find myself willing to bite the bullet. Should geologists and cosmologists really be 
spending their time trying to engage with, say, members of the Flat Earth Society or other people who 
tenaciously hold beliefs that logically contradict each other about the nature of our planet? Would the 
scientists necessarily be epistemically unjust toward them in not citing them, not attending their conferences, 
and the like? Conversely, would there unavoidably be “cognitive imperialism” in the Flat Earthers merely 







believing that the scientists are incorrect for failing to apprehend what they deem to be objectively true? My 
intuitive answers are “no” to these questions.  
Furthermore, as I mentioned toward the end of my previous article about Jenco’s conception of 
knowledge, there are probably epistemic reasons other than knowledge pursuit, particularly concerning 
the development of imagination, to continue to reflect on worldviews that appear to be false or 
unjustified, for all we can tell. And there are also reasons of morality and etiquette not to ignore, let alone 
denigrate, people whose worldviews seem to us to be false. If I were to visit an indigenous people and 
some of its elders shared their cosmology with me, I would be rude to be dismissive or not to listen at all. 
However, these matters again concern how to treat people who hold certain views, not the present issue 





At this point the natural suggestion to make on Jenco’s behalf is to go reaching for the first objection, 
concerning oppression. It might continue to seem as though one should not be inclined to believe others’ 
worldviews to be false since doing so would be likely to occasion disrespectful behavior, either small-scale 
dismissiveness or large-scale colonialism.  
However, I like to think that the exchange between myself and Jenco is a counterexample to this 
hypothesis. She thinks, or at least suspects, that I am (objectively?) incorrect about what knowledge must 
be like in order for cross-cultural philosophical engagements to make sense, and I have the same 
orientation toward her view. I submit, though, that our exchange has not involved epistemic injustice, 
oppression, or anything similar. By my lights we have instead exchanged competing views (about a 
mind-independent subject matter) with an eye toward learning from one another and with a respectful 
disposition. If we two intellectuals can do it, then why not two broader intellectual cultures?5 
 
                                                
1 In this brief essay, I set aside the issue of how to distinguish different philosophical traditions or 
intellectual cultures. The points made here about knowledge should apply, regardless of how one draws a 
distinction between two different epistemic communities.  
2 Another move would be to posit the existence of philosophical problems that demand consensus in order 
to be resolved, a move inspired by the work of Jürgen Habermas. This intersubjective approach, which 
contrasts with my objective one, is worth considering elsewhere. However, one reason I have for favoring 
objectivism is skepticism about the prospect of consensus ever being achieved among all rational enquirers. 
Another reason is that consensus, which has not yet been achieved, has not itself grounded the 
philosophical claim that consensus is necessary to resolve philosophical problems, meaning that there is a 
prima facie incoherence in the intersubjective position.  
3 Or perhaps intersubjectively true, i.e., in virtue of consensus, as per note 2 above.  
4 For one thorough articulation of such a perspective, applied especially to slavery, see Gilbert (1990). 
5 For comments on a prior draft of this article, I am grateful to the editors of the Journal of World Philosophies. 
